Colleges and universities display substantial differences in the ratio of students to faculty across fields or disciplines. At Harvard University, for example, economics has about 16 majors per full-time-teaching equivalent, while in other departments such as astronomy, Slavic, German and Celtic, the number of teaching faculty exceeds the number of majors. At the University of Virginia, the economics department teaches almost three times as many student credit hours (a measure of hours in the classroom multiplied by number of students in the class) as does the German department.
Colleges and universities display substantial differences in the ratio of students to faculty across fields or disciplines. At Harvard University, for example, economics has about 16 majors per full-time-teaching equivalent, while in other departments such as astronomy, Slavic, German and Celtic, the number of teaching faculty exceeds the number of majors. At the University of Virginia, the economics department teaches almost three times as many student credit hours (a measure of hours in the classroom multiplied by number of students in the class) as does the German department.
We begin by presenting some evidence on the extent of the variation in faculty resource allocation by field and the broad changes over the last several decades. We then consider potential economic explanations for these striking patterns. For example, a basic education production function, which seeks to maximize aggregate student learning, subject to a faculty salary budget constraint, will require that faculty be allocated across fields so that relative marginal gains in student learning equal relative faculty salaries. Differences across fields in student-faculty ratios could then arise either from differences in the pedagogical technology across fields or variation in relative faculty salaries. Additional university goals, such as research and graduate program productivity, or adjustment costs, as imposed by the tenure system, could also generate variation across fields in student-faculty ratios. However, we have only limited evidence that these arguments can explain the ongoing disparities in student/faculty ratios across fields and disciplines, which suggests that a substantial part of the explanation may reside in the politics rather than the economics of decision-making in institutions of higher education.
Evidence on Disparities and Slow Adjustment
Cross-discipline disparities Student-faculty ratios at our home institution, the University of Virginia, a selective public institution, can serve as a useful point of departure. Figure 1 shows the distribution of undergraduate majors per faculty member. Three social science disciplines -economics, psychology, and politics -have more than 20 majors per tenure-track faculty member. Even expanding the definition of faculty to include non-tenure-track faculty (which in the case of economics are mostly graduate students teaching independently), the ratios are still in double digits. At the other end of the distribution, we find a collection of physical sciences (notably physics and astronomy) and languages such as German and Slavic where majors per faculty are fewer than five. This variation in ratios of majors to faculty observed at the University of Virginia is not unusual; similar metrics from other colleges and universities suggest strong parallels.
No systematic data on both course-taking patterns and faculty counts by field seem to exist across all institutions of higher education; thus, to compare student-faculty ratios by field across institutions we must bridge across available data sources. We have data on faculty by field for three types of institutions: land-grant universities and private and public universities with graduate programs ranked by the National Research Council, where there is some overlap between public universities with ranked doctorate programs and the land-grant universities. Data on the field in which undergraduate degree recipients major are collected nationally by institution by the Department of Education. Combining the data on majors and faculty provides a window on the systematic dispersion in student-faculty concentrations across institutions.
1 Figure 2 compares the ratio of majors to faculty by field for private and public research universities (panels A and B) and land-grant public universities (panel C) with the lines indicating the range in the ratios of BA degrees to faculty from the 25 th to the 75 th quartile in the distribution and the squares indicating the mean BA-faculty ratio. The basic patterns are clear:
the social science fields of psychology, political science, sociology and economics tend to have appreciably higher ratios of majors to faculty than most departments in the physical sciences or
humanities.
An obvious question here is whether data on choice of major by students is a fair reflection of student demand for courses. After all, some disciplines, such as math or physics, consistently enroll many students in certain courses, but typically have relatively few majors.
Many students may value the chance to take, say, several years of study in a foreign language, even if they ultimately do not choose to major in that subject. These factors imply that the number of majors may misrepresent student demand for courses. Even the observed choice of major may not entirely reflect the pure student demand for majors. If students prefer lower student/faculty ratios, but popular majors have high student/faculty ratios, then differences in choice of major may understate the variation in tastes for different courses of study to the extent that institutions do not fully accommodate student preferences. Indeed, some departments or university administrators make it more difficult to major in the over-subscribed fields and easier to major in the sparsely-populated disciplines, which implies that the observed variation in major counts will understate the variation in student demand for majors.
Universities may also attempt to affect student demand for courses outside the major.
Most institutions require that courses be taken in specified areas such as foreign languages, science, humanities, English and so on. Such general education requirements may arguably be a useful part of higher education, but to the extent that they have an effect on the courses that students actually choose, they move enrollments away from what student demand would otherwise have been. Typically departments, especially those with lagging enrollments, are intensely interested in these requirements as they afford offer a way to boost student enrollments, an observation which suggests that political economy forces as well as economic forces may be at play here. We describe a political economy model in the final section of the paper.
Because most of our data on students concern majors rather than course enrollment, it is important to know whether the patterns we observe for majors are likely to hold for broader measures of course enrollment, too. Using course enrollment data for several institutions (University of Virginia, Yale University, Williams College, UCLA and the University of Minnesota), Table 1 shows that large differences across departments persist when the unit of analysis is credit hours taught per faculty member (that is, weekly classroom hours for the faculty member multiplied by number of students in class) rather than majors per faculty member. Because each institution measures students differently, we index the median department to 100. As Table 1 shows, departments at the 10 th percentile of credit-hours per faculty for their institution typically teach about two-thirds as much as the median, while departments at the 90 th percentile for their institution had 130-200 percent of the credit hours per faculty member taught by the median department. All five schools display substantial variation in the number of students served per faculty member. Still, the dispersion in credit hours per faculty member is not as large as the dispersion in majors per faculty.
Changes in Student Concentrations Over Time
Aggregate trends in choice of major show a substantial "flight" from arts and sciences disciplines between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, which can be decomposed into two factors: first, shifts in the concentration of higher education enrollment toward institutions concentrating in pre-professional preparation (Turner and Bowen, 1990) ; and second, changes in student demands within institutions.
The share of all BA degrees awarded by private research universities (like Harvard) and liberal arts colleges (like Williams) is small and has declined over the last four decades, falling from 5.8 to 3.6 percent for universities and from 5.7 to 3.5 percent for liberal arts colleges. In general, research universities and liberal arts colleges offer curricula based on arts and sciences fields, while many public and private institutions outside these spheres offer programs of study with greater professional emphases. 2 Thus, as the concentration of undergraduate students moves away from research universities and liberal arts colleges, the concentration of majors naturally shifts to professional fields.
Within-institution changes in choice of major combine cyclical changes in labor market prospects with secular trends in areas of study. When undergraduates select among fields, their decisions are based at least in part on their long-run predictions for earnings in a particular field, as well as their own expectations for labor force participation. Engineering is an example of a 2 "Research Universities", as classified by the Carnegie system, offer a full range of baccalaureate programs, offer at least 50 doctorate degrees per year and receive substantial federal funding; "Liberal Arts Colleges" are primarily selective undergraduate colleges that emphasize baccalaureate degree programs, awarding 40 percent or more of their baccalaureate degrees in liberal arts fields.
field where the number of student majors responds significantly to changes in economic prospects. Freeman (1976) Instead, women exited both the professional field of education and the humanities departments from 1970 to 1986 and turned to business, the life sciences and the social sciences. 4 Indeed, most of the movement in choice of discipline is attributable to this shift in the choices of women students. A primary question for our analysis is whether these significant changes in student demand were incorporated in faculty hiring in subsequent years.
Changes in Faculty Relative to Student Demand
From our perspective, the ideal data to calculate student-faculty ratios would include data on both course enrollments by field, institution and year for the numerator and data on faculty by field, rank, institution, and year for the denominator. While data on changes in undergraduate majors by institutions are readily available, faculty counts by field, institution, and rank are not available across the full spectrum of colleges and universities. The Department of Education collects total faculty counts by institution (not field), but there are no data collected at the national level on faculty by field and institution. 5 This absence of data significantly limits our capacity to calculate staffing ratios by field across institutions and over time.
Although conventional data sources do not allow disaggregation of student-faculty ratios by field of study, they can be used to document substantial variation over time and across institution types in the overall ratio of faculty to total enrollments. Bound, Lovenheim and Turner (2007) show that the variance across institutions in student-faculty ratios has increased over time, with the most selective institutions experiencing declines in student-faculty ratios between 1972 and 1992, while at many less selective institutions, particularly in the public sector, student-faculty ratios have actually risen.
The question of how (or whether) institutions adjust to changes in total enrollment differs somewhat from the question of how institutions adjust to changes in fields of specialization conditional on enrollment. In the first case, expansion or contraction in student-faculty ratios is the outcome of a resource allocation choice at the point of student admission or enrollment. In the latter case, an institution changes the deployment of faculty resources across fields in response to changes in student preferences for fields given a fixed number of students and expectations about the fields chosen by those students. This adjustment process is complicated by time and resource costs of hiring, contractual limitations in downside adjustments (like tenure), and the absence of viable opportunities for substitution across fields.
To measure these changes across fields within institutions, we have obtained access to a unique set of data for public universities maintained by Oklahoma State University which provides data on faculty by rank and field from 45 institutions from 1985 to 2001. These data are 5 Bowen and Sosa (1989) employ data from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients with data on degrees conferred and undergraduate enrollments to calculate student-faculty ratios by broad field and institution type in 1977 and 1987 within the arts and sciences fields. We do not follow this strategy because the source faculty data are limited to PhD recipients from U.S. institutions and will necessarily do a poor job of capturing faculty in the professional fields like business where many faculty may not hold doctorate degrees.
far from perfect--they cover only the subset of institutions who gave us permission to use their data--but it is a subset that we feel is representative of large public research universities and also represents the only available extended database covering faculty headcounts by rank. Figure 3 uses these data to describe the broad trends over time in four categories: for each of eight fields from 1984 to 2001, the lines with small hollow circles show the ratio of BA degrees to faculty, measured on the left-hand axis; the lines with larger hollow circled show the ratio of all degrees (including graduate degrees) to faculty, measured on the left-hand axis; the line with triangles, which shows total BA degrees, measured on the right-hand axis; and the line with x's, which shows total degrees, measured on the right-hand axis. With the vertical axes describing the ratio of degrees to faculty set at a common scale, an immediate observation is the large difference across fields, with the ratio for areas such as business nearly five times the level observed for the humanities. In many cases, student-faculty ratios generally do expand and contract somewhat over time with changes in degrees awarded. The upward trend in the life sciences, psychology and business is notable, reflecting strong increases in student demand in these fields over the 1990s. Overall, economics BA degrees show no rise in this data--and, indeed, some decline since the mid-1990s. The overall pattern here seems to be that while economics BAs have risen markedly at many private research universities and liberal arts colleges in recent years, many of the public universities represented in the data in Figure 3 , have substantial undergraduate business programs, which are either substitutes for a major in economics or overlap substantially (as is the case when departments of economics are situated within colleges of business).
How far back do these sustained differences go? As a preliminary answer to this question, we counted faculty by field from directories at the University of Virginia going back to the 1950s. At least at the University of Virginia, the rank order of differences across fields is long-standing: for example, chemistry, physics and the foreign languages have hovered at around 1-2 BA degrees per faculty member per year, or less, from the 1960s up to the [2005] [2006] academic year. In contrast, economics and political science moved from 3-4 BA degrees per faculty member per year at the start of 1970s to close at about 9 degrees per faculty member in [2005] [2006] . Total graduates from the University of Virginia tripled from 740 to 2,492 between 1966 and 1980, which suggests that the growing numbers of students were disproportionately drawn to fields like economics and politics, and that faculty numbers did not respond proportionately.
Explaining the Distribution of Faculty Across Fields

University Objectives and Resource Allocation
Imagine that university administrators were to allocate faculty solely to maximize student learning or student satisfaction by equating marginal faculty outcomes across disciplines. Even in such a setting, some differences in student-faculty ratios would be expected, because differences in input prices or faculty salaries and in the "technology" for teaching different subjects would lead to differences in student-faculty ratios. For example, lectures may be a reasonably effective mode of instruction in some disciplines (arguably economics), while the teaching of, say, foreign languages may require smaller class sizes to achieve the same learning outcome. If university objectives encompass other goals such as research output or prestige, further divergence across fields in student-faculty ratios would be expected. Moreover, desired investments in other outputs of the university requiring faculty as inputs --including graduate education and research differ across fields --producing variation in measured undergraduate student to faculty ratios.
Complicating the picture further is the extent to which different "levels" of faculty are close substitutes in production: graduate students or adjunct faculty may be close substitutes for tenure-rank faculty in some courses, but not in others. Indeed, many colleges and universities, have increasingly employed adjunct faculty who specialize in teaching and hold less than fulltime appointments (see Bettinger and Long, 2008 , for a review of the literature and an analysis of whether adjuncts differ in their effect on students). Adjunct faculty may offer cost savings to universities, particularly if benefits are not offered as part of the employment package, and may be a sensible adjustment to changes in student demand that are expected to be transitory, particularly as the elimination of mandatory retirement has increased the cost of tenured appointments. Our data do not include adjunct faculty.
How colleges and universities solve the resource allocation question depends on the nature of university goals, relative prices (wages) and the nature of the production function.
Prices: Adjustments to Differential Salaries
Higher salaries for faculty in some disciplines will lead universities to economize more on them. To measure the importance of field-specific differences in prices or market salaries, we offer some regression evidence.
We have data on the ratio of undergraduate majors to faculty at 132 institutions observed in the National Research Council data set. However, while we have salary data by field, we do not have salary data by institution. The only available source for data on faculty salaries at the level of specific fields is the Faculty Salary Survey assembled by Oklahoma State University which covers belonging to the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges. While there is not complete overlap between these institutions and the cross-sectional data from the National Research Council (NRC) data, we assume that the relative relationship of salaries across fields does not vary appreciably across universities.
Departments with higher salaries do have systematically more students per faculty member as illustrated in Figure 4 for both assistant professors and full professors. Economics and music define the extremes of these pictures, with economics representing the high-salary, high student faculty quadrant and music representing the low-salary, low student faculty quadrant. Cross-sectional regressions of measures of BA/faculty on available salary measures (which are limited to public universities) show a large and generally significant elasticity of student-faculty ratios with respect to salaries. The magnitudes of the estimates -between 1.75 and 2 -are quite large and likely should be taken as an upper bound, as regressions that used time-series variation in salaries would likely yield much smaller effects. Note that these elasticities imply both that growth over time in the dispersion of faculty salaries across disciplines widens the observed spread in student-faculty ratios and that faculty salary expenditures per student are actually lower in fields with relatively highly paid faculty. .
To the extent that salaries in economics and business programs have grown relative to those in other fields in recent decades, upward pressure on student-faculty ratios would be expected to follow. There is clear evidence that the salaries in economics and business have grown relative to those in the humanities and sciences. Curtis (2007) shows that salaries of assistant professors in economics grew from 124.8% to 151.4% of salaries of assistant professors in English over the past two decades and, using the elasticity estimates from above, such changes imply growth in student-faculty ratios in economics relative to English of about 40%. The growth in relative business professor salaries was even greater. Ehrenberg (2007) notes that the growth in inequality may be greater than that measured by salaries to the extent that there have been divergences in teaching loads, supplemental support such as research accounts, as well as other pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.
Of course, the cost of hiring an additional faculty member is not just the additional salary:
in the sciences, hiring a faculty member can entail start-up costs for space, equipment and research support that dwarf salaries. Ehrenberg, Rizzo, and Jakubson (2007) report that the average start-up costs for new assistant professors in physics, biology, chemistry and engineering range from $390,237 to $489,000. While such additional costs might be thought to put upward pressure on student-faculty ratios in the sciences, there is no systematic evidence supporting this conclusion in the data.
Trading Quality for Quantity: Research and Graduate Training
Universities may view the quality of research product and graduate training as substitutes for providing course options for undergraduates. For this reason, university administrators may in some cases effectively allow some departments to specialize in activities outside the training of undergraduates. To give one extreme example, the Princeton University Department of Mathematics, which is generally regarded as one of the best in the world, reported on its website in September 2008 that it had 58 faculty members and 66 undergraduate majors (including both juniors and seniors, up from 35 when we first started this paper two years ago). While this student-faculty ratio is well below the levels observed in Princeton's economics and politics departments, the research productivity of the math department faculty could be high enough that a reallocation of faculty lines would not serve university interests such as prestige or contributions to knowledge.
To provide systematic evidence on this point, our cross-sectional regressions in Table 2 employ measures of program quality found in the 1995 evaluation of graduate programs by the National Research Council and National Academy of Sciences. A panel of discipline experts were asked to rank each department using a 1-5 scale on the quality of faculty and the effectiveness of the graduate program; in addition, measures of faculty headcounts, publications and research support were also collected at the level of the department and the university.
Regression of the ratio of BA degrees to faculty on measures of program quality with field and institution fixed effects are shown in Table 2 , in columns 1 and 3. Moving from a departmental rank of a 3 to a 4 along this quality scale (about a standard deviation) implies a drop in the ratio of BA degrees to faculty of 0.44 (all) to 0.5 (public). This result is consistent with the hypothesis that universities value program rankings and quality and, within institution, more highly ranked departments will be less likely to shoulder the heaviest burdens of undergraduate teaching and advising. Of course, causation may go in the other direction as decisions to hire more faculty (and reduce S/F ratios) may lower teaching loads and increase research productivity, in turn increasing rankings. Doctorate-level students in a department might serve either as substitutes for undergraduates or, potentially, as complements through the provision of additional teaching resources. The link between the number of doctoral recipients at the department level and the ratio of undergraduate students to faculty is negative and significant, though not large in magnitude. Increasing the annual number of Ph.D.s by 10 is associated with a decline of 0.17 in undergraduate majors relative to faculty (Table 2, column 2). Research measures like the percentage of faculty with funded research or the number of publication per faculty do not add additional explanatory power, though these measures tend to be correlated with other assessments of departmental quality.
Small is Beautiful? Minimum Effective Size
Universities may value offering instruction in a range of subjects no matter how small the demand is for some of them, leading to a situation with some small departments with low ratios of students to faculty. One argument for maintaining these departments is that the "business" of being a university requires offering, say, classics, despite relatively low student enrollments.
Alternatively, providing small departments could be the optimal solution to the problem of maximizing student satisfaction if the intensity of student preferences is greater for finding a good field match with their interests than for the quality of instruction offered within the field.
Then, allocating additional faculty to satisfy the field interests of a minority of students might be more important than reducing student-faculty ratios in popular fields. A necessary additional assumption is some degree of economy of scale or minimum effective size of departmental faculty. A testable implication of this line of thought is that small departments will tend to have the lowest student-faculty ratios.
This minimum effective size argument has interesting implications for changes in the structure of departments over time. Going back to the early twentieth century, Goldin and Katz (1999) argue persuasively that the increased specialization of knowledge and growth of separate disciplines in the sciences and social sciences furthered economies of scale in higher education, thereby favoring the expanding public universities. Increasing specialization of knowledge and shifting intellectual and social trends create pressure for the creation of new departments, each of which must be staffed at some minimum effective size. Recent examples include environmental sciences; cognitive science; the division of many biology departments into "macro" and "micro" departments; newly popular languages such as Arabic or Chinese; area studies; ethnic studies; gender studies; and media studies. Holding the overall student-faculty ratio constant within an institution, the birth of new small departments should raise the variance of student-faculty ratios across departments. Holding the overall number of tuition-paying students fixed, starting a new department means that a university must either raise additional resources or divert resources that otherwise would have been devoted to another department or purpose. While closing a lagging department to make way for a new area of study is possible, the incidence of department closures is exceedingly rare. One might also ask why small departments are not merged with each other to enhance efficiency. One response is that there are natural discipline boundaries that are determined by the limits of expertise in judging faculty quality If classics and near eastern languages were merged, the classics faculty would be unable to judge the qualifications of potential near eastern language faculty.
An observable implication of minimum effective scale for a free-standing department is that small departments will have the lowest student-faculty ratios. To test this proposition, we ran regressions of majors per faculty at the level of the department and institution on the number of faculty in a department, specified alternatively as a continuous variable and as a categorical variable. Overall, we found no minimum scale effect, but when we limited our analysis to the humanities and social sciences there is clear evidence that small and very small departmentsthose with 5 or less and 6-15 faculty members -had much smaller student-faculty ratios. We interpret this latter result as evidence that minimum scale is part of the explanation for the low student-faculty ratios in some fields.
Dynamic Adjustment to Changes in Student Demand
Adjustment costs can be high in a university setting. After all, faculty tenure severely limits downside adjustment. On the other side, recruiting faculty is costly, time-consuming, and uncertain endeavor in a specialized high-skill labor market. Many faculty searches take a year or more to complete and some searches fail altogether.
We attempted to estimate the time pattern of how changes in student demand affect student-faculty ratios by adapting the canonical model of dynamic labor demand in Sargent (1978) . 6 In this sort of model, faculty demand in any period will be a linear function of last period's faculty, plus a term which depends on the forecast of student demand. Adjustment costs in this model can be understood as what is preventing the number of faculty from adjusting to what would otherwise be its "long-run" value. Our basic specification implies slow adjustment:
the one period impact of a percent increase in student demand implies a .044 percent rise in faculty, while the long run effect of sustained one percent rise would be a 0.6 percent rise in faculty. Thus, these estimates imply that even in the long run, faculty does not respond proportionately to changes in student demand. Interestingly, in our calculations differences in tenure across fields and institutions do not appear to affect the speed of faculty adjustment, which implies that other more deep-rooted institutional barriers to change may be at work In any case, this slow adjustment of faculty to student demand can surely contribute to the crosssectional differences documented earlier in this paper.S
Administrative Constraints
Instead of accommodating shifts in student demand with movements of faculty, alternative mechanisms may serve to discourage students from moving into popular fields and encourage them to study less popular subjects.
First, if student satisfaction in a field is inversely related to student-faculty ratios, and the most popular disciplines have the highest student-faculty ratios (as tends to be observed), the observed disparities in student demand as measured by degrees or credit hours taken will understate the true disparities in student interest. In other words, universities may attempt to boost enrollment in less popular fields by raising their quality relative to the more popular fields.
(Of course, some students may also prefer the anonymity of relative large majors: for example, perhaps large classes allow students to pass with moderate effort, whereas in small classes, where modest effort is likely to be confronted by direct feedback).
Second, most institutions place substantial constraints on student choices through area and distribution requirements. One interpretation of distributional requirements is that they represent an institution's paternalistic judgment of dimensions of academic experience that every student should encounter; another interpretation is that such requirements serve as a mechanism to shift student demand, "creating" demand for relatively unpopular areas of study. In some cases, entrance requirements for popular majors may also restrict students' ability to choose their field of study. At some universities, students must queue for classes with excess demand and accept class slots allocated by mechanisms like waiting lists and lotteries.
Beyond regulating courses of study through curricular requirements, universities may shift demand for particular majors by offering incentives or by actively promoting the virtues of the relatively undersubscribed fields. For example, Sabot and Wakeman-Lin (1991) argue that students base part of their course selection on grades, and differences in grading policies across departments may serve to shift the choice of student-major from low-grading departments, potentially distorting the match between student aptitude and major.
Universities may also seek to influence students' choices to reduce the concentration of undergraduates in "high demand" majors. Princeton University's "Major Choices" initiative begins with the baseline (not dissimilar to the data referenced at the start of this paper) that five majors --politics, history, economics, Woodrow Wilson (public policy) and English -among the 34 departments at Princeton, account for 45 percent of all juniors and seniors and, at the other end of the spectrum, four majors had fewer than 10 students (among juniors and seniors) and nine additional majors had fewer than 20 students (Stepanov, 2004) . The intensive public relations effort to encourage students to consider small majors seems to have resulted in some shifts away from the oversubscribed social sciences departments to small humanities and science departments though a number of these shifts have proven to be transitory. While the "Major The price mechanism is perhaps the tool most natural to economists as an instrument to affect the distribution of students by major, especially since it would seem administratively simple to develop technology to monitor course taking and to bill accordingly. However, few colleges and universities use pricing mechanisms to influence the allocation of students across fields. The exceptions are typically institutions that charge differently for high-demand courses of study such as engineering, business and journalism. Examples include the surcharge of $500
per semester for business majors at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, $250 per semester for journalism students at Arizona State and $500 per year for engineering students at Iowa State (Glater, 2007) . Critics of these plans cite evidence of greater price sensitivity among lowerincome students and the pedagogical desire to avoid student sorting based on price within a college.
Further Thoughts : Economics or Political Economy ?
The representation of faculty relative to undergraduate student demand varies appreciably across departments or fields of study, with core social sciences such as economics and political science often facing student demands per faculty member that are substantially greater than many sciences and humanities disciplines. Within fields, departments with shinier research reputations often enjoy lower student-faculty ratios, suggesting that universities are not just maximizing student satisfaction or learning. Moreover, institutions understandably economize on faculty in disciplines with higher relative costs of employing faculty. We also have evidence, at least outside the sciences, that economies of scale contribute to disparities in student-faculty ratios. Field-specific differences in the pedagogical production function, which are inherently difficult to observe, may play a role, too.
However, we suspect that differences across fields in the allocation of faculty relative to student demand persist even after accounting for relative salary, research preeminence, and pedagogical differences. This residual disparity might be the product of political forces within institutions that favor certain disciplines. For example, some of the disparities observed across fields as well as the stickiness of the adjustment process may well reflect a political process within the university favoring incumbency, as tenured faculty in low-demand departments create barriers to adjustment through time-intensive protest or efforts to increase student course demand artificially through curricular requirements and other incentives.
In a pure economic model, student demand determines faculty allocations. In a political economy model, political power determines the allocation of rents within the university and arises from faculty members acting to limit the adjustment to student demand and to ensure that departments maintain faculty lines. Certainly there are potential parallels between resourceallocation mechanism in academia and the capital budgeting process inside firms. The corporate finance literature finds that weak divisions within firms) are known to hold more than their optimal allocation of cash (from the perspective of shareholders), as executives in these units have lower opportunity cost of time and greater returns to internal lobbying to increase resources. In parallel, faculty in departments with weak student demand may also have a lower opportunity cost of time and thus be able to hold on to a disproportionate number of faculty lines by lobbying the central administration. The governance of academia in which deans and university presidents have only weak incentives to maximize faculty allocation further exacerbates this problem as "keeping the peace" may win out over optimal faculty allocation.
Note that one implication is that universities with large endowments may be appreciably more insulated from market pressures to adjust the allocation of faculty to student demand than those heavily reliant on student tuition dollars. To this end, for-profit universities are expected to be much more responsive to student demand than their well-endowed counterparts in the non-profit sector.
Willingness of faculty members to devote time to internal politics within the university surely affects outcomes in a political economy model of faculty allocation. Faculty in disciplines with lively labor markets will have less incentive and higher opportunity costs of engaging in internal politics and their departments will suffer correspondingly in a rent-seeking political competition. Purely anecdotal evidence on this point is that the ten members of Harvard's Standing Committee on General Education, which decides which courses count for various general education requirements, include five humanities professors, three of them from "small" language and area studies departments, and only two social scientists.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make a clean distinction between the economic model and the political economy model on the basis of our empirical evidence. The fact that departments with low salaries have lower student-faculty ratios is consistent with the economic model (substitution toward cheaper factors) and a political economy model in which faculty in lowerpaid fields invest more in institutional rent-seeking. Similarly, the extreme sluggishness of faculty response to changing student demand over time could be interpreted as either evidence of formidable adjustment costs or the use of internal political power to retard adjustment to student preferences.
Administrators and faculty members who perceive these ongoing differences in student/faculty ratios to be a problem have limited options given the internal politics of their institutions. One approach is to focus on allocating new positions through specific fundraising, thereby avoiding some of the political constraints. When faced with a plethora of small departments, administrators should ask whether more efficient scale can be achieved through the combination of departments within schools or the creation of inter-university collaborative networks. For example, an innovative program of the Associated Colleges of the South has aimed to resolve the problem of the small scale of certain departments at 14 small liberal arts colleges, where the average size of the classics faculty is less than three. Through the creation of a "virtual" department integrated across these institutions, scale was raised to 40 classics faculty, greatly increasing opportunities for peer interactions and specialized work and for students to have access to a wider range of potential advisers and mentors. However, even if these kinds of moderate changes can be enacted, a number of departments -largely in the humanities and sciences -will be left with the slack student demand for their courses and majors that they have faced for decades.
24 Source: Data on BA degrees awarded are from the HEGIS-IPEDs surveys. Data of faculty salaries are from the Oklahoma salary survey. To adjust for institution-wide differences in scale we first regressed BA-faculty ratios on a set of field fixed effects and institution fixed effects, using the resulting field specific effects measures (in logs) as the dependent variable regressed on departmental salaries (in logs).
from such a representation we can estimate the time pattern of the impacts on numbers of faculty of changes in student demand.
This model is convenient because it is mathematically very tractable. As is well known, however, the quadratic adjustment cost assumption imposes the twin unrealistic assumptions that net and not gross adjustments impose costs and that the costs of decreasing and increasing faculty size are symmetric. Hamermesh (1993) discusses why both of these assumptions are likely to be unrealistic. Anyone who has gone through the hiring process in an economics department knows that not only are adjustment costs not zero, the costs of engaging in enough hiring to keep net changes to the faculty equal to zero are often substantial. The academic tenure system would likely reinforce the asymmetry in adjustment costs.
In this model, faculty demand in any period will be a linear function of last period's faculty plus a term which depends on the forecast of student demand, with adjustment cost adding an additional reason for faculty dynamics--the greater the adjustment cost the more actual faculty will deviate from its "long-run" value. Empirically, by representing student demand for a field as a stochastic autoregressive process, faculty demand is characterized as an autoregressive distributed lag function of student enrollment and parameter estimates from such a representation yield the time pattern of the impacts on numbers of faculty of changes in student demand.
Using data on faculty counts from the Oklahoma State Salary Survey combined with data on degrees awarded by filed from 1985 to 2001, estimates of autoregressive distributed lag faculty demand functions are presented in Table A1 . Column 1 shows a bare bones specification, with faculty this year depending on faculty last year and current and past student demand as measured by BA degrees. The lag length is chosen to satisfy the Bayesian Information Criterion. As we argued above, degrees are not perfect reflectors of student demand because fields and disciplines differ in the degree to which they generate course enrollments relative to majors. However, it is reasonable to assume that the ratio of degrees to course enrollments remains stable over time so that the dynamic behavior of the log of degrees will mimic the dynamic pattern of the log of course enrollments which we do not observe. The large coefficient on lagged faculty implies slow adjustment: the one period impact of a 1 percent increase in student demand implies a .044 percent rise in faculty, while the long run effect of sustained one percent rise would be a 0.6 percent rise in faculty. The response is sluggish, and incomplete, in the sense that these estimates imply that even in the long run faculty does not respond proportionately to changes in student demand.
In equations 2 and 3, fixed effects for discipline groups and for institutions are added.
The coefficient on lagged faculty declines, but the short-and long-run impact multipliers are roughly the same as in equation 1. In specifications 4 and 5 we test for the possibility that faculty responses differ by subject. In specification 4 we interact field with lagged faculty, testing the equality of adjustment costs across fields. Both education and social sciences seem to have lower adjustment costs (that is, less dependence on lagged faculty) than other fields. In specification 5, we interact field with contemporaneous BAs and see that education and social science are less responsive while engineering, science and other professions are more responsive.
This result might arise from differences in the stochastic behavior of student demand in those fields.
As one test for the effect of tenure on adjustment speed, we looked at whether the average fraction of tenured faculty in a field-institution cell affects the speed of adjustment in that cell. No evidence of such an interaction effect was found. Differences in tenure across fields and institutions do not show up as differences in the speed of faculty adjustment.
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Another hypothesis is that the more university decisionmakers are shielded from the consequences of defying student demand, the less responsive they will be. This suggests that institutions which depend heavily on student tuition revenue will be more "market-oriented" than institutions whose revenues derive more heavily from sources somewhat insulated from student demand such as endowment earnings or tax revenues. A clear test of this notion requires data from a range of institutions including some that depend heavily on student tuition. While there is some variation in tuition dependence in the institutions in our data it is probably insufficient to provide a clear test of this hypothesis. 
